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DIVORCE LAWS AND THE INCREASE OF DIVORCE.
T HERE is do doubt that divorce is anathema in the United
LStates at the present time, and has been for some years past.
The tremendous increase in the rate of divorce, which far ex-
ceeds the rate of increase of our population, is by most people regard-
ed as a serious evil, and the undue advertising given to occasional
malodorous divorces in high life has brought the general subject of
the legal sundering of marital ties into considerable prominence and
disfavor. This increase in the number of divorces has been the
subject of editorials, of sermons, of investigations by various un-
official bodies and by the United States government. It is only very
recently that the brave sociologist has been found to say a word in
favor of this institution which has been so severely condemned.
The condemnation has been both upon religious grounds, as was
the case when Cardinal Gibbons described divorce as "a monster
licensed by the laws of Christian states to break hearts, wreck homes
and ruin souls,"1 and upon more materialistic grounds, as when
President Roosevelt, in an address to the Inter-Church Conference,
said "Questions like the tariff and the currency are of literally no
consequence whatsoever compared with the vital question of having
the unit of our social life, the home, preserved. It is impossible to
overstate the importance of the cause you represent. If the average
husband and wife fulfill their duties toward one another and toward
their children as Christianity teaches them, then we may rest abso-
lutely assured that the other problems will solve themselves. But if
we have solved every other problem in the wisest possible way it shall
profit us nothing if we have lost our own national soul, and we will
have lost it if we do not have the question of the relations of the
family put upon the proper basis."
'2
Along with the condemnation of the divorce evil has gone a very
general disposition to condemn our divorce laws as being responsible
for the evil. The committee on resolutions of the Congress on
Uniform Divorce Laws in its report to the Congress at its adjourned
session in Philadelphia, November 13, 19o6, speaks of the "many
evils engendered by the lax and unphilosophic system prevailing
I Quoted by Mr. justice Brown in his address to thet Maryland State Bar Asso-
ciation, published in Law Notes, Vol. XIII, p. x28 (October, i9o9).
2 Special Report of the Census Office on Marriage and Divorce, 1867-Igo6. Part
I, p. 4. This report, issued in two volumes in 1908 and z909, contains the statistics
which form the basis for this article, and is hereafter cited as Report on Marriage and.
Divorce.
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in many of the states."3 On this phase of the question also our late
president gave his views in his special message to Congress on
January 3o , 1905, in the following words: "'There is a wide-spread
conviction that the divorce laws are dangerously lax and indifferently
administered in some of the States, resulting in a diminishing regard
for the sanctity of the marriage relation."4 It can hardly be doubted
that this view obtains very generally throughout the United States,
namely that the great increase in the number of divorces -is largely
due to the fact that the divorce laws in most of the states are less.
strict than they should be. And it is also a very general belief, as
is shown by numerous expressions in editorial ditcussions of this.
subject, that the great increase in divorce ,during the last'twenty
years has been due to an increased laxity in the requirements for
divorce. The great publicity given to a few disgraceful divorces
obtained in a spectacular manner by prominent people has left the
impression that all divorces are of this kind, and that the law permits
any dissatisfied spouse to obtain freedom from the marriage yoke
by merely expressing a desire to withdraw from partnership. It is
believed that this view is accepted even by many lawyers. The
statistics on this subject have recently become available for the period
from 1887 to 19o65 and an examination of the facts thus disclosef
does not lend any support to this common misconception of the true
state of affairs. After the publication in 1889 of the Report orv
Marriage and Divorce, 1867-1886, by Carroll D. Wright, then Com-
missioner of Labor, an examination of the effect of legislation on
divorce, as shown by the statistics contained in this Report, wag
made by Dr. Walter F. Willcox, of Cornell University.6 Dr. Willcox
at that time pointed out very clearly that the influence of legislation
upon divorces granted during the twenty years from 1867 to 1886
was practically negligible. The present article is the outcome of a
desire to make a like examination of the facts disclosed by the later
report (covering the succeeding twenty years) and to present to
the profession the results of such examination.
The astounding increase in the number of divorces granted in the
last tweuty years, as compared with the twenty years covered by
Commissioner Wright's report, calls for some explanation. The
figures may be given briefly. In the twenty years from 1867 to 1886,
3 Proceedings of Adjourned Meeting of the National Congress on Uniform Divorce
Laws, p. x6.
'Reprinted in Report on Marriage and Divorce, I, 4.
$Report on Marriage and Divorce, see note 2 .supra.
6The Divorce Problem; Columbia University Studies in History, Economics anti
Public Law, Vol. I, p. z9.
A Study in Vital Statistics, 8 Political Science Quarterly, 69.
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.328,716 divorces were granted in the United States; in the twenty
years from 1887 to 19o6, 945,625. A more significant statement of
the increase is made by expressing the rate in terms of the number
-of divorces granted per one hundred thousand of married population.
On this basis the figures are as follows: in 187o there were 81
-divorces granted for every one hundred thousand of married popu-
lation; in i88o, 107; in 189o, 148; in 1900, 200. In other words the
-divorce rate in 19oo was about two and one-half times as great as
it was in 187o . The question which naturally arises and which
is of particular interest to the lawyer is how much of this increase
is due to lax divorce laws, and especially how much of it is due to
.any increased laxness in such laws. The answer to these questions
-May possibly throw some light upon the expectation that the number
'of divorces will be largely decreased by restrictive legislation.
Of course it must be granted that the divorce laws are in one sense
-responsible for all of the divorces, because if there were no such
statutes there would be no divorce, as is now, and for thirty-one
years has been the case in South Carolina, where all divorces were
prohibited by the constitution adopted in 1878. But it can hardly be
;assumed that any person in this generation would suggest the total
abolition of divorce as a cure for the divorce evil. It is commonly
stated that the result in South Carolina has not been such as to lead
-to similar actions by other states. Indeed, many observers report
that the sanctity of the marriage relation is no greater in that state
-than it is in the states where divorces may be obtained. And the
experience of South Carolina cannot be envied if it was a result of
-that experience which led to the enactment of a statute prohibiting
;a married man from leaving by will more than one-fourth of his
.estate to his concubine. Nor can it be proved that in jurisdictions
such as New York, where adultery is the only ground upon which
:an absolute divorce may be obtained, the general standard of conduct
and morals is appreciably higher than in other states with more
liberal divorce laws.
And it must be noted, on the other hand, that the recent increase
-in divorce has been in the face of the general course of divorce
legislation. There have been a few changes in the direction of
greater liberality, but most of the changes, as we shall see, have
-been in the opposite direction, and have made for greater strictness.
'In spite of this statutory current against easy divorce, the number of
divorces has steadily grown, and it is interesting to study the effect,
or lack of effect, of the various changes in the laws of the several
states. The effect of such legislation upon the increase or decrease
in the divorce rate can perhaps best be shown by taking a few spe-
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cific instances in which laws have been enacted which would result
in making divorces either easier or more difficult to obtain. During
the twenty years covered by the recent report of the Census Office,
there have been changes in the divorce laws of the several states
which may be grouped roughly into four classes: First, those in
which the length of time required to complete the offense of deser-
tion has been decreased; Second, those in which the term of residence
required before bringing suit has been decreased; Third, those in
which this residence requirement has been increased; Fourth, those
in which greater restrictions have been imposed upon the remarriage
of divorced persons. In examining the results of such changes it is
but proper to call attention in advance to some inevitable inaccuracies
which may possibly affect to a slight degree the conclusions to be
drawn from the facts as shown by the statistics. The reports on the
number of divorces granted in the various states are always by
calendar years. Changes in the divorce law may in different states
go into effect at various times of the year. For instance in one state
a change in the law may have taken effect in March. In another
state a like change may not have gone into effect until December.
In the first case the change could affect the number of divorces.
granted in that year. In the second case such an effect would be
most unlikely. But in this investigation it is impossible to deal with
the figures in any' way except upon the basis of taking the calendar
year as a unit, and it is believed that the possible inaccuracies"
resulting from such method of treatment are not very serious.
It is possible also that other causes than those brought about by
statutory changes may have some effect at various times in.increas-
ing or decreasing the number of divorces granted, as is shown, for
instance, by Dr. Willcox in his study referred to above where he
points out that periods of commercial depression and of hard times
have a very obvious effect in lessening the number of divorces.
7 But
whatever the effect of these inaccuracies may be it is believed that
the figures are sufficient to show that the effect of legislation upon
the divorce rate is much less than is generally supposed.
i. Decrease in period of desertion.
New Jersey-The period of desertion was reduced from three
years to two in 189o.8 The succeeding year showed a considerable
increase in the number of divorces granted for desertion, as would
be expected, for practically a double quota of desertion-terms would
be completed during that year, and thus become available as grounds
8 Political Science Quarterly, 69, 81-2.
s Laws 189o, p. 34.
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for divorce. But in subsequent years the increase in divorces for
desertion is considerably less than the increase in the total number of
-divorces, as will be seen by reference to the following figures: (the
.change in the law is marked by the vertical line).
Year: 1886 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96
Divorces granted
for desertion: 17, 147 130 141 158 210 219 225 214 250 234
Total number
of divorces: 286 226 201 238 251 272 306 311 342 332 352
Minnesota-The decrease from three years to one in 18959 re-
sulted in an immediate and permanent increase, both in number and
in proportion, of divorces on the ground of desertion.
Year: 189I '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 I9oo
Divorces granted
for desertion: "232 204 212 189 248 499 465 435 512 515
Total number
of divorces: 569 581 555 539 632 876 86o 829 936 989
Virginia--The period of desertion was reduced from five years
-to three in 1894,10 and there followed an immediate and permanent
increase, both in number and proportion, of divorces granted upon
-that ground, as will be seen from the following figures; but there
was no disproportionate increase in the total number of divorces
granted. This may perhaps indicate that in many cases in which
-under the old law a divorce might have been obtained on another
ground, the new law was taken advantage of to make desertion the
ground. As a matter of fact there was a marked decrease in the
number of divorces granted for cruelty and for adultery.
Year: 189o '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99
Divorces granted
for desertion: 121 141 137 41 197 249 255 258 331 314
Total number
of divorces: 386 380 381 407 486 523 525 539 6o6 6o4
Arizona-Here a double effect of legislation may observed. By
the Revised Statutes of 19oi 1l the period of desertion was increased
from six months to two years; naturally the number of divorces on
this ground fell off sharply, because the bringing of actions in all
cases in which desertion had then begun was postponed for a year
and a half. In 19o3, by an act approved March 18th 1 the period
9 Laws 1895, ch. 40.
20 Laws x894,. cl. 365.
11 § 3113.
SLaws 1903, ch. 33, § 4.
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was reduced to one year. The following year shows a slight increase,
a large part of which is perhaps to be accounted for by the fact that
the suits postponed by the law of ioi were just being brought to
judgment.
.Year: 1897 '98 '99 'oo 'O '2 'o3 'o4 '05 'o6
-Divorces granted
for desertion: 46 65 76 93 94 6o 87 102 1ao 112
7otal number
• of divorces: III 122 142 I58 179 136 185 215 226 214
These instances show that in two states where the period of
desertion was reduced forty and sixty-six percent respectively there
was a considerable increase in the number of divorces granted for
desertion. In two other cases the result was either negligible or did
not follow at all.
ii. Decrease in residence requirement.
New Jersey-In 1889 the period of residence required before an
action for divorce could be brought was reduced from three years to
-two, but there was no unusual increase in the number of divorces
granted, the number for each year of the five years preceding and
the five years following the change in the law being as follows:
s885 '86 '87 '88 '89 j '9o '91 '92 '93 '94
I86 286 -26 201 238 25, 272 3o6 311 342
Mississippi-Until 1892, two years' residence on the part of the
,complainant was required in suits for divorce on the ground of
desertion. Since that date, one year has been required. No increase
in the number of divorces granted upon that ground followed the
,change; indeed the average number of such divorces in the three
years preceding the change was greater than the average for the
three years following:
1888 '89 '0o '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97
269 330 "o6 29r 238 274 258 289 369 453
In neither of these cases. was there any apparent effect of the
greater facility for obtaining divorce.
iii. Increase in residence requirement.
There are ten states in which there has been some increase in the
period of residence required before the filing of a bill for divorce.
The results of this legislation have been tabulated and appear below.
The figures in the various states are not here referred to any par-
ticular year, but in each case the number of divorces granted in
jeach of the five years previous to the change of law and in each of
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the five years following the change, is given, the change in the law
being indicated by the vertical line, as in the previous tabulations :13
Arizona.......... 66 95 6o 84 
III III 122 142 158 i7
III 122 142 158 179 136 185 215 226 2x4
California ............. 785 896 1033 1074 1031 IO62 1120 1070 1253 1280
District of Columbia... i43 162 70 200 I86 97 136 68 72 86
Georgia ............... 229 352 438 431 497 449 393 394 434 42S
Michigan .............. 1383 1239 1227 1339 1488 1241 1459 1592 1571 1732
New Mexico .......... io2 io8 99 82 io7 107 129 117 145 153
North Dakota ......... 241 308 390 450 386 202 174 193 242 265
Rhode Island .......... 4o9 42o 484 516 421 210 412 461 368
South Dakota .......... 195 208 228 357 412 331 292 278 316 314
Wyoming ............. 63 84 99 122 144 94 160 137 '45 143
It could reasonably be expected that in states which had long been
noted for the number of divorces granted to non-residents, or new
residents, there would be a considerable falling off in the number of
divorces, and this result is shown by the figures for the states of
North Dakota, South Dakota and Rhode Island, all of which have
long enjoyed the unsavory reputation of being havens of refuge for
the unhappily married. Of the other states, the district of Columbia
and Michigan show a decrease in the number of divorces granted
after the raising of the residence requirement. The residence re-
quirement in Michigan related only to divorces granted for causes
arising outside the state. The decrease in the nuniber of divorces
granted lasted for only two years and since that time the increase in
divorce has been fairly constant, at about the rate which existed
before the change of law. In the case of the District of Columbia
the figures shown above cannot be taken to represent the result of
an increase in residence requirement alone because in I9OI an
23 The changes in the various states are as follows:
Arizona. The residence requirement was increased from six months 
to one year
by the Act of Congress of May 25th, z896. But it was not until 
goi that
the like requirement appeared in the territorial revised statutes (§ 314). If
the year z896 is taken as the date of this change, the upper line of figures
will represent the situation; if the change was in 19ox, the lower line.
California. Requirement increased from 6 months to x year, Laws 1901, 
p. 52.
District of Columbia. Requirement increased from 2 to 3 years, Code of igoi, 
§ 971.
Michigan. Requirement increases from x to 2 years for causes arising 
outside the
state, Laws 1887, p. IS'.
New Mexico. Requirement increased from 6 months to i year, Act 
of Congress
of May 25th, 1896.
North Dakota. Requirement increased from go days to I year, Laws 
18gg, p. 94.
Rhode Island. Requirement increased from i year to 2, Laws 19o2, ch. 971, § 4.
South Dakota. Requirement increased from go days to 6 months, Laws x893, P. 97.
[This requirement has recently (Laws 1907, ch. 132) been further 
increased
to i year.]
Wyoming. Requirement increased from 6 months to i year, Laws 
of igos, ch. 2.
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entirely new divorce law was adopted in the district, under which
an absolute divorce can be obtained only upon the ground of adultery.
In the other five states there was either no decrease at all in the
number of divorces granted or else there was only such decrease as
would be likely to result from the postponement of suits in which
the period of residence had not yet been entirely completed.
So here also in cases where the change in the law has been in the
direction of greater strictness there has been, except in the case of
the District of Columbia and in the anomalous cases of the "divorce
colony" states of Rhode Island and the Dakotas, no such marked
decrease in the number of divorces as might have been expected hnd
as was doubtless hoped for by the proponents of the stricter require-
ment.
iv. Restrictions on Marriage of Divorced Persons.
The speedy remarriage of one or both of the parties to a divorce
suit has often caused scandal; a comparatively small number of such
cases has attracted a comparatively large amount of attention because
*of the prominence of the parties concerned, and this notoriety has led
to the general belief that a very large proportion of divorces are
-obtained for the express purpose of contracting new and pleasanter
-or more profitable alliances. There is very little. ground for believ-
ing that such divorces form. an undue proportion of the total number
granted; such statistics as are available point to the contrary:
14 but
the belief certainly exists and it is doubtless true that a considerable
number of divorces are granted for just such a purpose. In order
to prevent this evil (and an evil it certainly is, though of much less
extent than is popularly believed) several states have placed re-
straints on the marriage of divorced persons. These restraints have
usually been for a stated period only, and the result has generally
been obtained in one of two ways: by prohibiting remarriage within
a stated time, or by providing that an absolute decree of divorce shall
not be entered until a stated time after the entry of a decree W'si.
In a few states, such requirements have been in existence for many
years; in others, they ire of more recent date, and the effect of these
latter is shown in the following table. In this table as in that under
iii. above, the vertical line is placed after the year in which the
restriction on marriage was adopted, or increased, as the case may
be, and the figures given denote the number of divorces granted in
each of the five years preceding the change and the five years fol-
lowing the change, except in three cases where the change has been
24 Report on Marriage and Divorce, I, p. 49 and Columbia University Studies,
VoL. I, p. 27.
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so recent that data are not available for all of the five years
following."5
Alabama ............. 1057 1299 1467 1365 1555 1876 1925 2162
California ............ 1120 1070 1253 1280 1484 1411 i5o6 1649 1732 1733
Colorado ........... 724 849 939 935 28o 598 422 531 607 663
District of Columbia... i43 i62 17o 2oo i86 97 136 68 72 86
Idaho ... : ............ 136 204 243 2a3 296 281 296 320
Illinois ............... 5252 5393 5653 5592 5715 5943
Minnesota ............ 86o 829 936 989 923 1122 io98 I027 1046 io66
Wisconsin ............ 1I34 1217 1328 i343 i453 1383 1464 1459 1478 1458
A considerable and permanent decrease in the number of divorces
granted is to be seen in Colorado and the District of Columbia just
after the enactment of the restriction on remarriage and it may be
argued that in those jurisdictions at least, the restriction had a very
definite effect. But in both cases the restriction was only one of a
number of changes made in the divorce law: in Colorado there were
a number of small changes made in 1893, and it is impossible to
apportion their results accurately ;-probably the falling off in the
riumber of decrees is, in part at least, attributable to this marriage
restriction. In the District of Columbia, it is impossible to draw
any conclusion on this point from the marked decrease from i86
to 97, for it followed a complete and revolutionary change 
in the di-
vorce code, striking out all grounds for absolute divorce save that of
adultery: In the other states shown in the table, there is'either a
very slight decrease, with no permanent effect at all, or else a normal
ineriease. So also in this instance of greater strictness in th e law,
no marked results follow: the greater strictness does not appreciably
lessen the number of divorces except in the case wbere the strictness
goes too far, as would doubtless be the general judgment upon the
new code of the District of Columbia.
15The changes in the law are as follows:
Alabama. Until 1903 remarriage could be permitted or refused 
in the discretion
of the court, Civil Code, § 2325. Ch. 30 of Laws of 1903, p. 49, prohibits
either party from remarrying within 60 days or during the 
pendency of an
appeal.
California. On February 25th, 1897, § 61 of the Civil Code was 
amended to pro-
hibit the remarriage of divorced persons within one year; 
this was held in
1902 (Estate of Wood, 137 Calif. 129) to have no extra-territorial 
effect, and
in 1903 two new sections (131 and 132) were added to the 
Code, providing
for a decree nisi to become absolute in one year.
Colorado. By Laws 1893, ch. 8o, § io, remarriage within i year 
is prohibited.
District of Columbia. By Code of March 3rd, z9oi, § 966, 
the innocent party
only is permitted to remarry.
'Idaho. By Laws 1903, P. 1o, remarriage within 6 months 
is prohibited.
Illinois. By .Laws x9o5, p. 194, remarriage within z year is prohibited.
Minnesota. By Laws 1901, p. 285, remarriage within 6 months is prohibited.
Wisconsin. By Laws x9o, cl. 27r, remarriage within x year is 
prohibited.
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The result of searching these four fields of inquiry must be admit-
ted to be practically negative. We have found changes in the law
which ought to produce marked effects in the increase or decrease of
the number of divorce decrees; the results of these changes we find
to be extremely slight or else entirely lacking, except in the anom-
alous cases of Rhode Island and the Dakotas, which are, or were,
confessedly refuges for the unhappily mated,'and in the case of the
District of Columbia, where an entirely new code was forced on the
District by one over-zealous senator at the close of the session
in i9o. The lack of significance of these exceptions may be appre-
ciated if we note that, for the period from i887 to i9o6 the total
number of divorces granted in all these anomalous divorce-colony
states, Rhode Island, the two Dakotas, and Nevada, all of the -famous
divorce states put together, amounted to barely two percent of the
total number granted in the United States during that period. The
fact of the matter is that divorce has become a problem far beyond
any control by mere legislation, and those who hope to remedy the
-evil, as they call it, by the adoption of a model divorce code, seem
doomed to disappointment. At least there is no great hope held out
by the results of such statutory changes as have already been tried.
The tide of divorce has gone on, steadily increasing in spite of the
increase of legal restrictions, and the question is now certainly'an
ominous one. But it is doubtful if it is a question that can be met
and settled by the legislator, unless he tries to settle it in some way
different from his well-worn attempts at regulating the evil condition
after the evil has been done. Perhaps the sociologists should be
listened to, who say that the way to prevent the evil of divorce is
to regulate marriage rather than divorce.
Ev s HOLBROOK.
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